Becker (1957) predicts that competition will eliminate discrimination. In contrast, Diamond (1971) argues that even an infinitesimal search cost can result in equilibrium at the monopoly price. To my knowledge, this is the first study testing these competing theories in a real world setting: the commercial sex market. Drawing on a hybrid discrimination model, I distinguish between statistical discrimination based on willingness to pay and taste discrimination. The commercial sex market analyzed is the red light district (Geylang) in Singapore, which is a highly competitive labor market. Clients' search costs are negligible, and search is legal. Using data from a survey I conducted of illegal street prostitutes in Geylang, I find sex workers discriminate against potential clients based on ethnicity despite an excess supply of sex workers. These differences are not explained by the variation in prostitute quality, since price differences remain even after controlling for the prostitutes' fixed effects. I find evidence of both statistical and taste discrimination. Sex workers are more likely to approach Caucasians who are perceived as having a high willingness to pay, and less likely to approach Bangladeshis who are perceived as having a low willingness to pay. The difference in initial prices offered to these two groups is as large as 50 percent. In contrast, sex workers avoid * I am very grateful to Kevin Lang, Claudia Olivetti and Johannes Schmieder for their guidance. I also wish to thank Andrew Oswald and seminar participants from Asian Meeting of Econometrics Society (2013), Singapore Economic Review Conference (2013), Mirco lunch seminar at Boston University and Brown Bag Seminar in Nanyang Technological University for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
Introduction
The canonical discrimination model in economics, Becker (1957) , predicts discrimination cannot survive in a competitive equilibrium. In contrast, Diamond (1971) implies the opposite: discrimination can prevail in a competitive equilibrium even when the search cost is small. In this paper, I test these two competing theories in the highly competitive sex market of Singapore and find that discrimination persists. Moreover, sex workers engage in both statistical and taste-based discrimination, with the former being the most dominant force. They discriminate based on the client's willingness to pay by using ethnicity as an indicator. They also practice taste-based discrimination against ethnic groups with darker skin tones and that have a perceived tendency towards violence.
A significant amount of literature in economics is devoted to the investigation of race, gender and age discrimination in the labor, consumer and housing markets. In his pioneering work, Becker argues that discrimination cannot survive in a competitive equilibrium because competitive forces will drive prejudiced participants out of market. Applied to my setting, sex workers who discriminate would lose out to other sex workers who are willing to sell their services at a lower price. In contrast, Black (1995) analyzes equilibrium discrimination using a random search model where search is costly. My setting is similar except that I study the consumers' search for a service rather than the workers' search for a job. Diamond (1971) formally shows that monopoly pricing (i.e. discrimination) must persist in an otherwise competitive market when firms sell a homogeneous service and customers search sequentially, even when the search cost is infinitesimal. Applied to my setting, it implies that sex workers are able to discriminate against customers as long as the customers incur a search cost.
There are very few market settings available to economists to directly test the applicability of these theories. Much of the research relies on audit or correspondent studies (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Neumark, 1996; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) , field studies (List, 2004; Banerjee, Bertrand, Datta, and Mullainathan, 2008 ) and regression studies (Goldberg, 1996) . However, as Heckman and Siegelman (1993) argues, the audit and correspondent studies often lack identical comparison groups. Even when the comparison group is identically constructed, it still faces the threat of variations in unobservables. They address discriminative behavior but not whether this behavior affects the equilibrium. Regression studies, however, inevitably suffer from missing variables. Field experiments also have pros and cons. They do enable researchers to control the environment. List (2004) uses the natural setting of the sportscard trading platform and use real market participants to identify the existence and nature of discrimination. But, when it comes to field experiments, there is the risk that the experimenter influences the interactions and thus biases the results.
In this paper, I examine equilibrium discrimination in a unique real market setting: the commercial sex market in Singapore. It is an ideal setting due to the presence of a large number of nearly identical sex workers selling homogeneous services to clients who search at negligible cost forms a highly competitive market.
1 My study specifically explores the sex workers' discrimination against clients of different ethnicities. I use unique data on both the sex workers and on their transactions. I do not interfere with market operations, but only record information obtained from sex workers regarding the most recent transactions. This method ensures that the data fully reflects the market dynamics. I also contribute by distinguishing the sources of discrimination. During the interviews, the sex workers revealed that they price services differently based on the client's ethnicity, which they take as a signal of the client's willingness to pay. They tend to actively approach Caucasians, Japanese, and Koreans, which are the ethnic groups whom they believe to be wealthier. Thus, the sex workers inflate the prices quoted to these clients. On the other hand, sex workers express animus towards ethnic client groups who have darker skin tones and who are perceived to be more sexually violent. They report that they avoid these clients (such as Indians) or ask for a higher price to compensate for the disutility from working with them. The former hints at statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972) while the latter suggests taste-based discrimination. Since the sex workers' discriminating preferences influence their behavior and pricing strategy, I build a hybrid discrimination model explaining: 1. Sex workers' inclination to actively approach clients; 2. How sex workers use observable wealth signals and incorporate their taste preferences in setting the service price; 3. How the bargaining outcomes will differ depending on the sex workers' behavior in step 1 and step 2. The model's predictions allow me to identify the source of discrimination. Empirically, I perform fixed effects regressions, together with logit fixed effects and probit regressions (in some incidences), to study the likelihood of the sex workers approaching a client before he approaches them, determinants of the sex workers' initial price, and the likelihood that the bargaining fails in accordance with the theory model.
The outline of the remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 offers a comprehensive institutional review on the commercial sex industry in Singapore. I describe the theoretical model in Section 3, followed by a description of survey and data in Section 4. Section 5 presents the identification strategy and, key empirical results are thoroughly discussed in Section 6. Lastly, I conclude in Section 7.
2 Commercial Sex Industry in Singapore 2 Prostitution in Singapore dates back to the 1800's when Singapore was a British colony (Warren, 1993) . Singapore had been striving to build a safe and clean city-state, but the police still unofficially tolerated and monitored rampant prostitution activities 3 . In the late 1990's, the authorities issued special licenses for the operation of "legal" brothels. Only ex-offenders are qualified to apply for such licenses 4 . The issuance of licenses ceased around 2000 and left over 100 licensed brothels running in the red light district, Geylang. The legality of prostitution is not fully recognized by the law in Singapore. According to Human Rights Report: Singapore by U.S. Bureau of Democracy Human Right and Labor (2009), prostitution-related activities (soliciting, operating a brothel, pimping) are not legal and anti-vice police deploy weekly raids to signal their authority. Though licensed brothels are exempt from police raids, they are restrained from publicly soliciting for customers. Sex workers from regulated brothels are also subject to regular medical check-ups 5 .
The largest portion of the commercial sex industry consists of illegal brothels and illegal sex workers who mainly come from China, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines (Agency France Press, 2008) . The business follows a seasonal trend with its peak months in June, September and December when Singapore has the most tourist visits. Business is slowest during the Chinese New Year period when both supply and demand are low. I observe a few prominent features of the commercial sex industry in Singapore: First, the supply of sex workers is highly diversified in terms of country of origin, while domestic supply is low. Concurrently, the demand for prostitution is also diversified in the sense that clients are of different ethnic backgrounds. Second, the legal and illegal segments coexist within the flourishing underground market. Third, the illegal market consists of low-, middle-, and high-end market segments featuring sex workers of varying quality and targeting different segments of demand.
2 Unless otherwise cited, all the descriptions presented in this section are based on the interviews with the sex workers,the pimps, and workers in this sector (i.e. bartenders). 
Low Domestic Supply & High Foreign Supply
Singapore has one of the best educated populations in the world. 95 percent of its female population are literate and 63 percent of female residents have secondary or higher educational qualifications (Ministry of Statistics, Singapore, 2013) . There is less incentive for a local female to be a sex worker. Moreover, being a prostitute in the small conservative island is threatening to a woman's reputation. Thus, the Singaporean sex industry is populated by sex workers from poor neighboring countries who travel to Singapore to sell their bodies after being attracted by the high returns. The high returns appear even more attractive due to the high income differential between Singapore and poorer neighboring countries. Furthermore, working as a sex worker away from home mitigates the risk of being judged by one's own society. For these reasons, girls from poorer neighboring countries are willing to accept the high risks that come with being a sex worker, although it is also possible that they are not fully aware of the risks in the first place. However, it is worth noting that not all of these sex workers work permanently in Singapore. Most of them are on short-term visitor passes. They visit Singapore from time to time not only to seek lucrative earning opportunities but also marriage opportunities with Singaporean men and Western males. The low domestic supply and high foreign supply is consistent with Edlund and Korn (2002) who predict that the number of the domestic sex workers will decrease as domestic income rises.
Diversified Composition of Demand
The demand for prostitution stems from both locals 6 and expatriates of different ethnic backgrounds. Over the years, female undergraduates in Singapore have outperformed males in many professions. The existence of 300,000 white-collar workers in Singapore who cannot find wives made headlines around 2005. Few women are willing to marry men below their education and economic status. At the same time, Singapore has a large population of expatriates. One third of the workforce in Singapore is made up of foreign workers, accounting for about 1.2 million people (Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, 2012) . 10 percent of foreign workers belong to the PMET (Professional, Managers, Executives and Technicians), while the remaining 70 7 percent are low-and semi-skilled non-PMET workers. The majority of the non-PMET workers who are in the construction and manufacturing sectors are men. Bangladeshi construction workers in particular are frequent visitors to the Geylang red light district, representing a sizable demand for affordable sexual services. In addition, Singapore is a popular tourist hub. In 2011, it attracted 13.2 million tourists and generated S$22.3 billion in tourist receipts (Singapore Tourism Board, 2012) . It is fairly common for tourists to visit an international destination in order to seek sexual services. According to the US ambassador Harry Thomas, 40 percent of male visits to the Philippines are for sex (Australia News Report, 2011) . Thus, the influx of male tourists, to a certain extent, creates a stream of demand for prostitution in Singapore as well.
Illegal Market Segments
Besides the legal brothels in Geylang, there are three main segments in the illegal market. When defining the segments by the quality and price of the service, we can categorize the best-known red light areas Geylang (even-numbered lanes) as the low-end segment, the renowned Orchard Tower Bars as the mid-tier segment and the nightclubs as the high-end segment of the market. The sex workers in Geylang and Orchard Tower Bars are mostly freelancers operating with tourist passes. Many of the Geylang streetwalkers are associated with pimps who are backed by gangs. They are full-time sex workers with no other source of income. In contrast, many women working in the nightclubs are hired by the clubs as art performers (i.e dancers, singers and hostesses) under a legal work permit. They make money as sex workers on a part-time basis. Sex workers solicit only within their own segments. For example, a Chinese street sex worker in Geylang will not solicit in Orchard Towers. The Thai and Vietnamese girls who solicit in the bars inside of Orchard Towers will not go over to Geylang for business either. That is because they fall into the different segments based on their own characteristics and networks. Trespassing across the segments may risk their safety and earnings. Sexual services typically take place in venues like motels and hotels, as well as in cars or the client's residence. A full-time sex worker will return to her original venue immediately after finishing with a client. Any costs, such as taxi fare and hotel room charges are usually borne by clients. Other, more scattered, forms of illegal prostitution typically operate as KTVs, massage parlors and social escort. KTVs are entertainment pubs where clients can book rooms to sing songs with friends and be entertained by friends or by the hostess. Prostitutes in the KTV are managed by the KTV manager, and therefore have less freedom to decide work hours, price and which customer to take. The owner of a KTV is subject to a jail sentence if he or she is caught running a prostitution business. Massage parlors are also popular places to seek sexual services. Massage girls offer massage service followed by sexual service for a "tip". Massage girls enjoy the benefit of an "early-warning" system 8 , where a warning will be granted to the parties involved when the police are on their way, so that they can dress before the police arrive. There are hundreds of massage parlors throughout the city with entrance fees ranging from 28 to 80 dollars. Most of them are licensed business premises with a Public Entertainment license. Moreover, there are other social escorts who advertise their services on the Internet and on flyers. Some social escorts can be very expensive. Together, sex workers from these venues represent a relatively small portion of the total sex worker population in Singapore.
Geylang (Street)
Competition This paper focuses solely on the low-end market (Geylang). Geylang stands alone as the largest market in Singapore's commercial sex industry, as its size and popularity make it a top destination for prostitution. The services found in Geylang and venues like Orchard Tower Bars and nightclubs are not perfect substitutes, because services offered in the higher-end venues are more diversified and target wealthy individuals. The Geylang market is highly competitive. Prostitution activities are concentrated in a small zone of 25 lanes. Within it, large numbers of nearly homogeneous prostitutes publicly solicit on the streets and sell similar services. Differences in sex workers' characteristics may make one more desirable than the other. Nevertheless, they are nearly perfect substitutes in the clients' eyes 9 . On the other hand, clients bear a negligible search cost in the red light district. First, there is zero risk of being penalized for patronizing the prostitutes. Second, there is minimal social cost in terms of reputational loss by walking in the red light district, because Geylang is a popular tourist and dining destination. Most importantly, clients are able to easily locate a match within 2-5 minutes due to the high density of prostitutes on the street.
Composition and Background
Chinese and Vietnamese sex workers dominate the scene and are patronized by mostly Singaporean men, Caucansian men and Bangladeshi construction workers. All the sex workers solicit within the areas of even-numbered lorong (lanes) between lane 1 and lane 30. There is little differentiation in the services offered and the large number of the suppliers make this micro-market close to a perfectly competitive market. The service rate is set to float around S$30-S$200 with a median price of $60 and standard deviation of $35. Freelance street sex workers solicit independently but are collectively overseen by pimps depending on the areas of their business. Each lorong (lane) is controlled by a pimp who oversees the business (protects the women from abnormal clients), provides the girls' accommodation, and protects them from being arrested in the event of police raids. In return, they ask for a cut of the unit service price (normally about 30 -40 percent) as compensation and $10 a day for accommodation and transport services. Tourist visas enable sex workers to re-enter Singapore frequently. Many of them travel to Singapore by land or sea. When a sex worker is transported from her country to Singapore, she usually does not need to make any initial monetary investment. All the related costs are borne by the parties who manage her trip and work. In return, she is mandated to provide the first 60 services for free and share the profit with a pimp for each additional service. Assuming the average service price is S$50, each sex worker in effect pays S$3000 in exchange for a working opportunity in Singapore. The actual transportation cost is fairly low as they are escorted by the cheapest mode of transport. The majority of the profits are shared by the managers at both ends and the middlemen. The coordinators need to provide sufficient pocket money for the sex workers in order for them to pass through customs safely. The pocket money is meant to help the sex workers show the custom officers that they are financially able to stay in Singapore. Because the initial engagement of the prostitutes and clients take place on the public street, flirting and negotiation time are relatively short in this segment of the market, as both parties prefer to maintain minimum public exposure. As a place for cheap sexual services, it is a favorite destination for construction workers and other less wealthy clients. The plentiful supply of Chinese women also makes Geylang the preferred choice for Chinese clients who desire a "girlfriend" kind of experience with the sex worker. It is also a particularly attractive venue for elderly single men who desire companionship. Sex workers in Geylang start work late in the afternoon or early evening and finish work in the morning.
Theory Model
In this section, I aim to capture both the effect of the sex workers' statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination with a simple model. I assume sex workers discriminate by selectively choosing the clients to approach and by adjusting their prices. They maximize utility by making these two decisions simultaneously before taking any action. The clients make the decision to accept or reject the offer after receiving the initial price.
Hybrid Discrimination Model
In this market, both the sex worker and the potential client simultaneously search for a match. The client's true willingness to pay is private information. The sex worker relies on the potential client's observable characteristics (i.e ethnicity, outfit, attractiveness etc) to infer his ability to pay. The sex worker decides whether to approach him after observing these characteristics. After approaching the potential client, the sex worker proposes an initial price. The potential client can either accept or reject it. If the man takes the offer, there is a deal. If the man refuses the offer, both the sex worker and the man return to their sequential search.
Model Setup
The sex worker wants to maximize the surplus from sales. Since the sex worker's technology is linear, she aims to maximize the surplus function from each transaction. The expected surplus function is expressed in equation (1).
A sex worker decides to approach a client only if her expected surplus from the sale is greater than her reservation expected profit. If approached, she sells the service at a price of P with the cost of C, and she will obtain the proceeds only if the client accepts her offer.
Sex Worker's Behavior
When a sex worker sees a potential client, she does not observe the potential client's private information on his willingness to pay, but she does receive a signal. Since other wealth-revealing signals are noisy, the sex worker uses the client's ethnicity (S) as the main signal to infer his willingness to pay. Signal S for each ethnicity falls into a bounded interval and clients with the same ethnicity but different characteristics (i.e. outfit and attractiveness) take different values of S in that interval. These intervals are disjoint and S (namely the intervals) is assumed to be increasing in the client's willingness to pay. Signal S allows us to detect the sex worker's discrimination resulting from rational calculation given market friction. The interval range of S for each ethnicity ensures that different types of clients with the same ethnicity will be approached with different probabilities by any given sex worker.
Let θ be the distaste indicator and θ = {A, B} , where A is the non-discriminated group and B is the discriminated group. The field interviews suggest sex workers find Indian clients distasteful because they are perceived to have a higher tendency of sexually violence and have a darker skin tone. Therefore, θ is also a function of the client's ethnicity. Nevertheless, S and θ are different characterizations of the ethnicity.
Let us denote d to be the sex worker's reservation expected profit. She will approach the client only if her expected surplus from the sale exceeds d. The value of d depends on the opportunity cost of waiting and the arrival rate of clients. We assume the opportunity cost of waiting is fixed for each sex worker and the arrival rate of the client follows a Poisson distribution. The client's arrival rate is higher over the weekend than during the weekdays, hence we expect a higher reservation price for the weekend.
It is costly for sex workers to provide the service. Such cost C is higher for the disliked client group (C A < C B ). C is the sex worker's reservation price once she approaches the potential client, while d is the sunk cost of the approach.
Client's Behavior
After learning the asking price, the client rejects or accepts the offer with the rejection probability F (P ; S). For simplicity, we write the rejection function as F (P − S). S is assumed to be given and fixed for each client, and it is normalized so that F (P − S) is decreasing in S. S acts as a shift parameter which shifts the distribution of (P − S) and in turn influences the distribution of the rejection probability with respect to each type of S. F (P − S) has density function f (P − S). F (P − S) is assumed to be strictly log concave. The strict log concavity of F (·) ensures it is increasing in P and its inverse hazard function
, is strictly decreasing in P (m (P − S) < 0).
Sex Worker's Optimal Strategy Pricing
The sex worker chooses P to maximize the surplus function in equation (1). The firstorder condition is
Using the implicit function theorem, since m(·) is strictly decreasing in P , we have
and
Therefore, the equilibrium price offer P * is strictly increasing in the cost of providing the service and in wealthy signal S, but with a smaller magnitude.
Approaching Decision
A sex worker will approach the potential client as long as her expected surplus is positive.
Equation (6) implies that a sex worker is less likely to approach a client whom she views as more costly.
In addition,
Using equation (4), we are able conclude
Equation (8) implies that a sex worker is more likely to approach a client whom she views as more wealthy.
Empirical Predictions
Step 1. Decision to Approach
For any given price P and signal S, an increase in the cost of providing service C will decrease a sex worker's expected surplus, hence resulting in a lower likelihood of approaching the client group B in comparison with the non-discriminated group A.
For any given offer price P and cost C, the sex worker expects a higher surplus from the clients with a higher wealth indicator S, and therefore are more likely to approach the clients who have a higher S than the ones with a lower S.
Step 2. Price Setting Condition on sex worker's approaching, it is only optimal for a prejudiced sex worker to sell the service to the discriminated potential clients B at a higher price, as she incurs a higher cost by working for disliked clients. This indicates the sex worker's taste discrimination.
Condition on sex worker's approaching, when the sex worker observes a higher signal of wealth S, she believes the client has a higher willingness to pay, and hence will suggest a higher price to maximize her surplus. It reveals the sex worker's statistical discrimination.
Step 3 Client's reaction to the price offer Condition on the sex worker's approaching, the discriminated group will be asked to pay a premium on the initial price. Since F (P −S) is an increasing function of P , it follows trivially that the discriminated client's rejection rate is higher than the non-discriminated group, for a fixed S.
For a fixed C, the clients with a higher wealth signal will be less likely to reject the offer compared to the clients with lower wealth signals.
Step 4. Discount on the Initial Price Offer
This model does not allow for bargaining and hence offers no conclusive prediction on discounts. The realized discounts could be collectively determined by the bargaining skills of both the sex worker and the client as well as the bargaining time, together with price P and rejection rate F (·). Assuming that both parties have equal bargaining skills and equal bargaining time, we can establish the following intuitive discussions on the outcome of the discount with respect to clients with different S and θ. A sex worker extracts more surplus from the client with higher S as she would place a higher P on them. She is still able to earn more proceeds from the high S client even if she grants a higher discount to them in comparison to the low S client. Therefore, we expect the client with higher S to receive a higher discount than the client with lower S. Moreover, I expect the sex worker to give a smaller cut of the initial price to the disliked client group compared to the not-disliked group. This is because she wants to avoid contact with the disliked group and has less incentive to sell services to them. In short, there will be a larger contract curve for clients with high S and clients with low C, which suggests more opportunity to negotiate a reduction in price.
Partial Equilibrium
For any given pair of {S, θ}, the partial equilibrium is characterized by following conditions: 
Survey Design
The survey is comprised of two parts. Part I is designed to collect individual information about the sex workers and Part II is designed to collect detailed information regarding each sex worker's recent business transactions. The first two sections of Part I details the sex workers' personal characteristics and work-related information. A set of questions aiming to capture the sex workers' work attitude and preferences are also included. For example, they are asked to rank the factors they use to determine whether they will approach the client and how they will price the service. They also need to rate how much they like/dislike the clients of different ethnicities. We require them to provide the reasons for why they prefer clients of one ethnicity over another, given that the clients have similar looks and the same service price. The fourth section in Part I is meant for the enumerators to fill in, where they are required to rate the interviewees on aspects such as beauty, physical figure and English skills in the eyes of the clients immediately after they finish the interview. Rating the sex workers from the client's point of view is a common practice widely adopted in surveys with sex workers (i.e Survey with the legal sex workers in Mexico and Ecuador). In Part II, we ask the sex workers a series of questions regarding the most recent 4 to 7 transactions. Both English and Chinese versions of the survey forms were prepared for use.
The survey questionnaires have undergone iterative revisions. The early versions were drafted after conversations and interviews with sex workers and industry insiders. The faceto-face conversations with the insiders from different networks enabled us to cross-verify the information they provided. The surveys were not fully rolled out until we finalized the questionnaires: as a final check, each enumerator was asked to interview his/her close contacts, and to brief us on the responses of the interviewees as well as how the interviews were actually conducted. We then modified possible responses to close-ended questions and reworded the questions, as well as coached enumerators to rephrase the questions in a way the sex workers are able to better understand in cases where reading questions directly from the survey does not work.
Training of Enumerators
Three enumerators were hired to perform the surveys. Each had been personally involved in this market and is friend with either the prostitutes or the pimps. We were able to conduct phone and personal interviews with the sex workers and pimps via their connections. They also introduced the sex workers' regular patrons to us to enable us to gather facts about the clients' preferences. Our knowledge of the institutional background of Geylang street was acquired through these casual interactions with insiders.
Since each enumerator was hired at different points during the study, they were trained independently. The training officially starts with an overview of our project and questioning enumerators about the industry. For questions they are not able to immediately answer, they either provide feedback after checking with their contacts or set up appointments for us to talk to their contacts directly. As such, enumerators obtained a better understanding of the research objectives and background. I then thoroughly went through each question to explain why I ask it, how the questions should be asked and the preferred recording format. I encouraged them to write notes on the survey if the sex worker offers additional feedback.
Data Collection
It is not feasible to fully randomize the sample in this market for four reasons.
First, due to the underground nature of this business, we do not have complete information on the composition of the population and exact geographical distribution of the sex workers.
Second, the fact that some of the sex workers from Geylang are controlled by pimps reduces our ability to randomize the sample. These sex workers do not have the autonomy to accept interview invitations. I needed to invite pimps for drinks or pass gift vouchers to the pimps to obtain their consent for the interview, and these requests were not always approved.
Third, due to social stigma and the desire to preserve their own safety, some sex workers refused to be interviewed especially when I needed to record all their responses. Relatedly, the more experienced sex workers were more open to our interview requests compared to the timid newcomers.
Fourth, the enumerators had a higher chance of interviewing less attractive sex workers, as they have longer unemployment periods during each shift and are more tempted by the gift voucher we offer. However, this is where we expect the enumerator's networks to help them access different kinds of sex workers to maintain a balanced sample composition.
Nonetheless, we compensated for the limited control by obtaining a good mixture of sex workers in other ways. This was done by visiting different lanes in Geylang at different times of the night and on different days of the week. The reasoning is as follows: 1. Different lanes: Different lanes may feature sex workers from varying countries at varying prices. Based on interview results, the sex workers reported the existence of informal "turfs" similar to gang turfs, whereby there are unspoken rules about which sex worker can operate in which lanes; 2. Different times: The more popular sex workers are more likely to start work later at night than the less popular ones; 3. Different days: The more popular sex workers are also more likely to take some weekdays off, as compared to less popular ones.
This strategy ensures a moderately randomized sample. The enumerator's decision to visit certain lanes at certain times is not influenced by any factor that will cause them to generally meet the same type of sex workers all the time.
Furthermore, while customers' arrival rate and work intensity may follow a pattern across time of night and days of the week, the probability that a sex worker is idle and willing to accept the interview at any random visit of the enumerator is fairly random.
I focus solely on heterosexual transactions where the women are the sellers and the men are the buyers, since females represent the majority of the sellers in the adult service market in Singapore. The enumerators are mandated to read a letter of consent and to gain the sex workers' understanding before starting the interviews. Each interview is expected to take about 30-45 minutes. The enumerator was paid at a rate of 15 Singapore Dollars for each survey they collected and each interviewee received a gift voucher of 10 Singapore Dollars to compensate for her time. Sometimes the sex workers agreed to take the survey as a favor to our enumerators and did not ask for a monetary reward. In those cases, the enumerators invited them for a simple meal and conducted the interview either during the meal or on a separate occasion.
After Collection
I scrutinized the finished surveys carefully to weed out major mistakes, especially in the early stages. Some of the early submissions of the surveys were excluded from the database. Reviewing the survey right after the submission allowed me to correct errors immediately before the enumerators forgot the information and before it was entered into the computer. Data-entering personnel recorded any unconventional answers following the rules we formulated and made notes on a separate sheet for the changes for each data point. For example, many of the sex workers could not recall the exact amount of their earnings and their clients' ages. Thus, the data entry personnel calculated the average using the range provided and made a note of these changes. This procedure allowed me to have a consistent answer format for each question and enabled me to trace the changes I made to the raw data.
Data Description
The data has a panel structure where information on the sex workers' recent transactions along with the characteristics and preferences of the sex workers were collected. The sample consists of 177 street sex workers from Geylang with a total number of 805 transactions. The average number of transactions the sex workers reported is 4. There were 674 transactions where the sex workers initiated the price and 131 transactions where the clients initiated the price. The latter 131 transactions are used as a basis for checking the clients' pricing behavior and consumption capability.
The Sex Workers' Characteristics
Singapore has a rich composition of sex workers in the illegal market. My sample includes street sex workers from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore 10 (see Table 4 ).
Sex workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Sri Lanka are less pervasive but are also active and concentrated in the low-end market. As commonly found, the sex workers in my dataset have low educational attainment. 72 percent of the sample have completed only primary education, and 21 percent of these women are illiterate. Less than 10 percent of the sample have been educated beyond high school. The average age of the sex workers is 20, with the youngest aged 18 and the oldest aged 39. The majority of the sex workers in the sample are single (82.5 percent) and 23 percent have at least one child. Over half the sample have at least 2 years' experience as a sex worker prior to working in Singapore 11 . The average sex worker works in Singapore for about 2 years. Sex workers on Geylang street are full time sex workers. It is reported that they work 6-7 days a week (see Table 5 ). The average daily working hours are 9 hours on weekdays and 11 hours over the weekends. The average number of customers the sex workers have a day is about 4 12 . Earnings from providing sexual services serves as a major source of the sex worker's income. Other forms of income are the tips or earnings from being booked by the clients for a whole day. The average unit price for sex is S$70 with lowest rate of $30 and 10 Sex workers from Taiwan, Philippines and Eastern Europe are often found in higher-end markets like Orchard Tower and nightclubs. 11 There is a group of sex workers who entered this industry with prior exposure. The pimps either purposefully traveled to rural mountains in Thailand (for example) to select candidates or relied on local pimps in the supplying country to send the candidates. One of the most favored groups of sex workers in the market consists of newcomers. 12 World Bank (2009) reports that Bangladeshi brothel sex workers have 2 customers a day whereas street and hotel sex workers have 2-6 customers a day.
highest rate of S$200 13 . The average service duration is around 55 minutes when excluding overnight services.
Transaction and Client Characteristics
Sex workers receive clients from a wide age group and of different ethnicities. The client's age can range from 20 to 60. Singapore is a multiracial society. The male population is 74 percent Chinese, 13 percent Malay and 9 percent Indian (Ministry of Statistics, Singapore, 2013) . Together with the inflow of foreign laborers and tourists, the pool of men patronizing sex workers is comprised of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Caucasians, Middle Easterners, Indians, Malays, Bangladeshis and other Asians. The Chinese, Caucasians, Indians and Bangladeshis are the major consumers of adult services in Geylang (see Table 6 ). Together, the Chinese and the Caucasians represent 50 percent of our client sample. One out of five clients in our sample are regular customers, and about 30 percent of the total clients are tourists. Most of the transactions take place in either motels (70 percent) or hotels (22 percent). Only about 6 percent of the transactions occur in the client's residence. There is very high awareness of contraception among both clients and sex workers in Singapore. Over 99 percent of the transactions in my sample involve the use of condoms.
Price Discrepancy
Price differentials in adult services among racial groups was documented by Levitt and Dubner (2009) Table 2 ). The observed initial price differentials could be due to sorting of clients and sex workers, or the sex workers' discrimination. Because the final price is determined by the interaction of both sex workers and clients, it is not clear that the disparity is caused by discrimination. Thus, I will analyze this question more rigorously in Section 6 and show that sex workers' price discrimination is 13 The rate in legal brothels in Geylang is fixed at S$50 per 20 minutes, half of which goes to brothel owner. It is typical for a legal brothel sex worker to serve 10-20 customers a day, as the average duration for each service is about 20 minutes.
indeed the predominant driver of price disparity.
The Sex Workers' Preference and Attitude
The sex workers reveal distinct attitudes towards clients of different ethnicities. They consistently favor Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Caucasian clients. On a scale of 1 (dislike) to 5 (like very much) with 3 being "like", these three client groups earn an average rating of 4 (see Table 1 ). The sex workers collectively express their fondness towards these clients for the following reasons: (1) Chinese clients are more likely to be returning customers; and, (2) the Caucasian, Korean and Japanese clients are more willing to pay. This observation is uniform even across the more attractive and less attractive sex workers. However, the less attractive sex workers rate Caucasian, Korean and Japanese more highly by a magnitude of one, as compared to the more attractive sex workers. In contrast, the Malay and Indian clients earn low average ratings of 2.74 and 2.07, respectively. The rating disparity is more exaggerated among Indian and Bangladeshi clients. Attractive sex workers give the lowest rating of 1.77 to Indians. The sex workers express a general distaste towards dark skin tones which places the Malays and Indians at a disadvantage 14 . Sex workers further justify their distaste towards Indians by claiming that Indian men have a higher probability of being sexually violent 15 . Bangladeshis receive a higher rating than both the Malays and the Indians at 3.10, despite having the lowest reservation price. It turns out the Bangladeshis' rating is inflated by the preference of the less attractive sex workers who give them a rating of 3.29. It is self-reported that the less attractive sex workers favor Bangladeshi men for "quick money" -Bangladeshis demand cheaper but also shorter services. Effectively, these less desired sellers take the less favored part of the pie in order to survive in this competitive market. In addition, sex workers have a set of criteria that determine whether they will approach potential customers and how they set the initial price. The top three factors influencing such behavior are "the money the client spends on them"
16 , "Ethnicity of the client" and the "Looks of the client". It is evident that sex workers rely on the client's ethnicity as a critical signal to make business decisions. 
Identification

Estimation Equations
We perform the following three regressions:
where i is the sex worker and j is the client; O ij , L ij and T ij are the ratings the sex worker gives to the client based on his outfit, attractiveness and sweet talk 17 , respectively. W i is the sex worker's fixed effects. E j is the ethnicity of the client which is vector of dummy variables with 1 being the comparison ethnic group and 0 being the base group (Chinese men). G i is the set of sex workers' characteristics, which includes the sex worker's country of origin, age, years of experience, education, marital status, beauty and English skills. C j is the set of client characteristics, which includes the client's age, whether he is a regular customer and whether he is a tourist. All three equations have similar controls, except that the variable recording the client's sweet talk is not added into the equation 9. For estimation of the probability of failed bargains, additional explanatory variables like the sex worker's bargaining skills and the transaction day are added. For the purpose of this study, I restrict the sample to cases where the sex workers initial price. Only one out of eight transactions involved the client suggesting the initial price. These transactions are used to verify the sex worker's beliefs (i.e to check whether the perceived wealthy group would suggest a higher price). Equation (10) runs a (sex worker's) fixed-effects regression of the log initial price. It is the pillar of the analysis, as it reveals whether the sex workers exercise price discrimination and it also pinpoints the determinants of such discrimination. Estimation results from the remaining regressions are used as auxiliary tools to help identify whether the price discrimination is taste-based or statistical.
I use a fixed-effects on logit equation (9) to study whether the sex workers approach the clients first. It is not feasible for us to track their activities continuously throughout a given week or a day. Therefore, we do not have a record of whether the sex workers approached every potential client who walked by. However, we do know whether the sex worker is the first to approach the client. This proxy effectively captures the sex workers' tendency to approach clients. Due to the loss of observations when performing a fixed-effects logit regression, I also conduct a probit regression to compare the results. Equation (11) examines the outcome of price negotiation. We define the probability of the bargaining process failing as the probability of the client rejecting an offer. The failure to reach a deal after negotiations could either be because the client does not want to pay the initial price, or because the sex worker does not want to take the lower counter-offer. But, both possibilities reflect the client's rejection of the initial proposed price. For later reference, it is worth mentioning that our data show that over 90 percent of failed bargains are caused by price disagreement. Both fixed-effects logit and probit regressions are performed for this estimation. I rely on probit regression for later analysis because logit fixed effect causes the loss of a large number of observations and results in less precise estimates.
Identification Strategy
The parameters of interest in this study are β 1 , β 2 and β 3 . Three possible cases are identified using these parameters. Case 1. Statistical discrimination + No/Weak Taste Discrimination:
For example, let us compare the group of men who are believed to have a higher willingness to pay, the Caucasians, with the group who are believed to have a lower willingness to pay, the Chinese. If there is no or weak taste-based discrimination, we expect the sex workers to more actively approach Caucasians than Chinese, assuming that they are both equally well dressed and not disliked. Sex workers will suggest a higher service price to Caucasians and negotiations with them are less likely to fail. Case 2. Taste Discrimination + No/Weak Statistical discrimination:
Here, let us compare the base group (Chinese) with the disliked group (Indians). If statistical discrimination did not play a role, then we would expect sex workers to be less likely to approach Indians and more likely to put forward a higher initial price. Negotiations with Indians are also more likely to fail. Case 3. No Statistical discrimination + No Taste Discrimination:
This is a trivial case. When there is no discrimination, we should observe an equal treatment towards clients of all ethnicities.
Empirical Results
Price Discrimination
I discussed the observed initial price discrepancy (proposed by the sex workers) in section 4.2.3. With the aid of empirical results, I showed that the price disparity is due to discrimination. One potential argument for the price discrepancy between the perceived wealthy clients (the Caucasians, Koreans and Japanese) and the Chinese clients could be that the former are more likely to be tourists who patronize the market during peak holiday seasons, when demand is high. That is why they face hiked initial prices. To offset this effect, I conducted the survey during the off-peak months.
Sortings between sex workers and clients is a more pressing concern. Over 80 percent of transactions (see Table 3 ) involving the perceived wealthy client groups (Caucasian, Korean and Japanese) are associated with more attractive sex workers. Most of the less attractive sex workers are attached to less desired clients (Bangladeshis, Malays and Indians). This could explain why the richer clients receive higher prices -they are financially capable and more willing to purchase premium services.
Here, I want to reemphasize that sex workers are highly substitutable in the eyes of the client. While richer client groups favor the more beautiful sex workers because they can afford them, our interviews suggest that the less wealthy within the group are also equally happy to buy services from less attractive workers.
To assess whether the price differentials are driven by sex workers' discrimination, I examine estimates from the sex worker's fixed-effects regression on initial prices using the transactions where the sex workers initiated the price (as shown in Equation (10)). Chinese clients are used as the base group for analyzing prices and other dependent variables. The sex workers place an 18 percent premium on services with Caucasians and a 26 percent discount for Bangladeshis in comparison to the Chinese (see column (3)-(5) in Table 7 ). Random effect estimates agree with fixed-effects in this finding. OLS estimate indicates a 13 percent premium on the prices quoted to the Caucasians. Fixed-effects and OLS estimates together suggest that the majority of the initial price differences between client groups are not driven by differences between sex workers, but by price variations imposed by each individual sex worker, namely the within variation. When taking Bangladeshis as the base group, all other ethnicities receive significantly higher initial prices, with Caucasians receiving the largest hike of 44 percent. Caucasian clients receive a 19 percent and 14 percent higher initial price than Malays and Indians respectively. On the other hand, no significant initial price disparity is observed between the Chinese and the Malays, or between the Chinese and the Indians for any identical sex worker.
Price discrimination is often observed in markets where the customers have identifiable traits and services are not resalable. In my study, in addition to ethnicity, these traits include the client's outfit and whether the client is a tourist. But, the most important factor is the client's ethnicity (see detailed discussion in section 6.2). Ethnicity alone explains 46 percent within variability in price differentials. Adding the variable ethnicity also helps to explain an additional 6 percent of the within variations in initial prices after controlling for the sex workers' and clients' characteristics. On the other hand, the better-dressed customers are quoted prices that are 9 percent higher than those who are less well-dressed. Tourists also pay a 7 percent price premium compared to local customers 18 .
Statistical Discrimination v.s Taste-based Discrimination
In this subsection, I shed light on the nature of the sex workers' discriminative behavior. Studying initial prices alone will not be sufficient to draw a robust conclusion on the sources of discrimination. Following the identification strategy derived from my theoretical model, I collectively scrutinize the estimates from equation (9), (10) and (11) by studying how the sex worker decides to approach clients, how she sets the initial prices and the outcomes of bargaining. Because of the sorting effect, both estimates from the full sample and the subsample (as determined by the sex workers' beauty) are examined. Empirical findings suggest that the sex workers' discriminative behavior is largely profitdriven and also involves a high degree of taste preference. The discussion on the nature of price discrimination in my case study is twofold. First, I investigate the sex worker's treatment towards the Caucasians and the Bangladeshis, in which I argue that there is a strong presence of statistical discrimination. Second, I argue that the sex workers practice tastebased discrimination against Indians.
Statistical Discrimination
Caucasian Table 8 . summarizes the estimates from three estimation equations with the full sample and subsamples. Sex workers are 17 percent more likely to approach Caucasian clients compared to Chinese clients, and impose an 18 percent premium on the initial price for Caucasians. The bargaining process with Caucasians is slightly less likely to fail than the bar-gaining process with the Chinese. However, the difference in failure rates is not statistically significant.
According to the identification strategy derived earlier, the ideal case for statistical discrimination mandates a higher probability of failed bargains with the Chinese than with the Caucasians. This is based on the assumption that the sex worker's belief regarding the Caucasians' higher reservation price is true, and that the two client groups possess the same market information as well as equal bargaining skills. However, the small difference in the bargaining outcomes between the two ethnicities could be due to a violation of these assumptions. Firstly, Chinese men are more familiar with the local market. Knowing this, sex workers are more likely to suggest an initial price that is closer to the men's true willingness to pay. This results in higher bargaining success rates with the Chinese even though they are only willing to pay lower prices. Secondly, Chinese clients are more accustomed to and are more capable at bargaining, or at least this is what the sex workers have reported. The sex workers cherry-pick Caucasian men because they are more likely to seal the deal with Caucasian at a higher rent with an equal amount of bargaining effort. Hence, heterogeneity in the bargaining behavior of the clients could potentially contract the gap in the bargaining outcome between the two groups. Therefore, I conclude that sex workers exercise statistical discrimination against Caucasian clients.
The more attractive sex workers are popular among both Caucasian and Chinese clients. Their fondness rating for the Chinese is high at 4.13, which is half a point more than the rating for Caucasians. They have an intrinsic preference for Chinese clients because they believe Chinese men are more likely to be repeat customers.
Beautiful looks grant sex workers more market power. The more attractive sex workers are able to demand a 22 percent premium on the initial price proposed to Caucasians, which is 4 percent higher than what the less attractive workers ask for. Assuming both types of sex workers are providing the same service, this 4 percent margin can be deemed as a form of beauty premium.
On the other hand, although less attractive sex workers cannot compete with more attractive sex workers in appearance, they can make up for it by being more proactive in approaching potential clients. They are 28 percent more likely to approach the Caucasians than the Chinese. It is worth mentioning that the enumerators hired for the survey are Asians, and they rank the sex workers' beauty by presumably Asian standards. There is a level of subjectivity involved, as some sex workers who appear to be less attractive to the Asian enumerator may be considered very attractive to Caucasians. If the less attractive sex workers are aware of this subjectivity, then it is not surprising to find that they approach Caucasians more proactively, because it is a profit-maximizing strategy. In short, this is a full and precise demonstration that the sex workers' discriminative actions are deliberate. They discriminate statistically based on wealth indicators (the client's ethnicity) and their asset endowment (personal beauty).
Bangladeshis
Likewise, I find that the sex workers statistically discriminate against Bangladeshis as compared to the Chinese. Furthermore, my analysis reveals that the sex worker's looks is an important factor that affects the way in which this discrimination occurs. I will first address the similarities before moving on to the key differences.
Both attractive and less attractive sex workers propose lower initial prices to Bangladeshi clients with a discount of 24 percent and 20 percent, respectively. This is plausible because the majority of Bangladeshis in Singapore are hard laborers and earn only 20 Singapore Dollars (17 USD) a day. Thus, the fact that Bangladeshi clients have the lowest willingness to pay is not private information in this market, and is likely to have contributed to the lower initial prices.
Moreover, both the attractive and less attractive sex workers experience a higher likelihood of bargaining failure when dealing with Bangladeshis, which is 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
The key difference between the two groups of sex workers lies in the probability of approaching Bangladeshis. A perfect case of statistical discrimination predicts that if sex workers discriminate against the Bangladeshis due to their lower reservation price, then we should expect them to have a significantly lower probability of approaching Bangladeshi clients than Chinese clients as well. However, I detect the contrary phenomenon among the less attractive sex workers. While the attractive sex workers are 24 percent less likely to approach Bangladeshi, I do not detect any statistically significant lower probability when it comes to less attractive sex workers.
The fact that over 90 percent of the transactions with Bangladeshis are conducted by the less attractive sex workers sheds some light on this seemingly puzzling finding. It suggests that the less attractive sex workers are forced to take the less profitable and less favored share of the pie to survive. That explains why they approach Bangladeshis as often as they approach the Chinese even though Bangladeshis are not able to match the prices that the Chinese are able to pay. It is plausible that they need to do so in order to secure much-needed but less desirable clients. Thus, it is very clear that less attractive sex workers positively discriminate against Bangladeshis.
Lastly, I assess the possibility of taste discrimination. As mentioned, the sex workers find clients with dark skin tones distasteful. Bangladeshi men are usually regarded to have darker skin that is similar to Indian men. However, intriguingly, every pimp and sex worker interviewed insist that they can distinguish between Indian and Bangladeshi men, and claim that Bangladeshis are fairer than Indians. We are not able to confirm whether their judgment is accurate. But, what we can conclude is that they have a way to identify Bangladeshis and they do not have any distaste towards the characteristics that the identified Bangladeshi men possess.
Taste-based Discrimination
Indian
The sex workers' behavioral response towards Indian men forms an interesting case of taste-based discrimination. Recall the sex workers' distaste towards Indian men due to their darker skin tone and perceived tendency of sexual violence. Indians are ranked the least preferred client group by both attractive and less attractive sex workers. Empirical evidence in Table 8 supports the argument that sex workers exercise taste discrimination against Indians. I begin the analysis with the more attractive sex worker group. Facing high demand, beautiful sex workers are less constrained by the goal of maximizing profit and have the luxury of avoiding disliked clients. They minimize contact with Indians, which is shown by their significantly lower tendency to approach Indian men (24 percent less likely compared to Chinese men). They demand a high premium of 19 percent on the initial price from potential Indian clients to compensate for the expected utility loss from the transaction (if they decided to sell), as well as to discourage the Indians from further negotiation (if they do not intend to sell). Table 12 lists the OLS regression results on the initial price proposed by the clients. Conversely, the initial price given by Indian clients is relatively lower. For example, they suggest an initial price that is 16 percent lower than the prices given by the Chinese, which implies that Indians may have a lower reservation price. Moreover, I find that bargaining with Indian men is 28 percent more likely to fail. It is expected since beautiful sex workers try to deter Indian men with inflated prices, knowing that Indians are not able or are unwilling to match that price.
In a nutshell, beautiful sex workers want to avoid Indians and impose inflated initial prices so that the bargaining process has a higher chance of failing (in comparison to the Chinese). This proves that beautiful sex workers practice taste-based discrimination against Indians.
The situation holds even with the less attractive sex workers, except that they do not impose inflated initial prices on Indians. Similar to the argument I presented in the case of Bangladeshi men, the equal pricing is due to the fact the less attractive sex workers are less desired and possess less market power. However, this finding about less attractive sex workers should not alter the conclusion that sex workers taste-discriminate against Indians.
Indian men are a minority in Singapore and only 10 percent of the client sample is represented by Indians. Therefore, widespread prejudice is not required to yield results that show taste-based discrimination. Rather, strong prejudice from a small number of sex workers would be sufficient to sustain taste discrimination. However, it must be noted that the true magnitude of taste discrimination in this market may be understated in my findings, because the incidents where sex workers avoid Indians are not captured in my data.
Robustness Check
Our conclusion on discrimination maybe biased if the services provided to clients of different ethnicities by each individual sex worker is not homogeneous. For this reason, I reexamine the price equation by controlling for the actual service duration, as well as for the number of sexual acts 19 performed in a transaction, separately .
Service Duration
In studies of sexual service prices in the commercial sex market, both Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) and Moffatt and Peters (2004) have controlled for the service duration when estimating the price equation. I did not include the service duration in previous regression exercises because it is not conventional to set the service time during price negotiation in this market (based on the interviews). The direct influence of service time on price setting is expected to be weak. However, it is recognized that the sex workers have a sense of the expected service duration for each ethnic group, and may set prices that incorporate this expectation. Table 10 lists the estimates from three fixed effects specifications. Column (1) contains the original fixed effects on initial prices without considering the duration; Column (3) contains the fixed effect estimates after controlling for service duration. I find that evidence of the sex workers' price discrimination against Caucasians is reduced from 18 percent to 8 percent after the service duration is controlled. The price difference also becomes statistically insignificant. In my sample, the average service duration with the Caucasian men is about twice as long as the Chinese men and Indian men, and three times longer than the Bangladeshis and Malays 20 . It suggests that service duration could be a key determinant of the initial price differential between the Chinese and Caucasians. Nevertheless, I claim that my argument of the sex workers' statistical discrimination against the Caucasians remains intact because the sex workers use the potential client's ethnicity as an indicator of the expected service time. They know that Caucasians are more likely to buy longer services. Thus, they are willing to approach Caucasians more frequently. Because competition among the sex workers is severe and waiting is costly, it is not surprising to observe that sex workers prefer selling their services to Caucasians. They are able to make a higher profit from transactions with Caucasians than with the Chinese through a slightly inflated price and longer service duration. For Bangladeshis, the argument of statistical price discrimination stands firm. Notice that we lost about 200 observations after adding service duration. In column (2), I conduct a robustness check by running regressions without controlling for service duration using the smaller sample for regression with service duration in column (3). I confirm that the change of the estimates from column (1) to column (3) is not due to the sample bias. The conclusion that sex workers exercise statistical discrimination remains credible.
Number of Sexual Acts
Different sexual acts are sold as a combo in most of the transactions. On average, 2 types of sexual acts are sold in each transaction. Only 20 percent of transactions involve solely vaginal penetration and 1 percent involves solely oral sex. Similar to the case of service duration, I re-estimate the price equation by controlling for number of sexual acts performed in a transaction. Column (3) in Table 11 shows that the price discount rendered to Bangladeshi is dropped from 22 percent to 15 percent after accounting the variations on number of sexual acts. However, this contracted price difference remains statistically significant. The price differential between the Caucasian and the Chinese is not really changed. Thus, the previous conclusion on sex worker's statistical discrimination based on ethnicity is not biased.
Transaction Day
Controlling for service type and duration does not affect the initial price differential between the Chinese and the Indian. I further test the robustness of the taste discrimination results by finding connections between the variable client's ethnicity with the transaction day. Sex workers are 15 percent (see column (2) in Table 9 ) less likely to approach Indian men on weekdays (Monday-Thursday) and this likelihood is further reduced by an additional 23 percent (p-value=0.06) over the weekend. It is very clear that sex workers are inclined to avoid Indians, but they implement this preference strategically. They aim to strike a balance between minimizing work disutility and maximizing monetary returns. Therefore, they approach Indian men less often over the weekend when they have more demand.
Miscellaneous Discussions Other Ethnicities
As in the case of Caucasians, the sex workers carry out statistical discrimination against Japanese and Korean clients by asking for a significantly higher initial price with a 9 percent premium. However, there is no significant difference in their tendency to approach Chinese and Japanese, Koreans and the bargaining failure rate between these two groups is similar. This less pronounced effect is driven by the fact that the majority of Japanese and Korean clients who patronize the Geylang area are tourists who are often brought in by middlemen. The small sample of Japanese and Korean clients may also bias the estimations results.
There is no price discrimination found between the Chinese and Malays. Bargaining with Malays is 22 percent more likely to fail. They are less likely to be approached, but this difference is not statistically significant. It seems that the Malay clients are less favored because the sex workers are not able to extract as much profit from them as from the Chinese. However, there is no convincing evidence to support either statistical discrimination or tastebased discrimination.
Final Price and Discount
As a last step, we review the final price and discount 21 of the negotiation. I run both OLS and sex worker's fixed-effects on these two variables and outputs are presented in Table  14 . The same control variables used in previous regressions are used here. Furthermore, the initial price, bargaining time and sex worker's bargaining skills are also added. We did not include the sex worker's rating of the client's bargaining skills in both equations, as the rating given by the sex worker could be biased by the outcome of the bargain.
The final price and discount may be influenced by unobservable external factors such as how good the business is around the time of the negotiation and how active the police's patrol activities are. The bargaining skills of clients may also play a role in shaping the final price and discount. Therefore, estimates are imprecise. Caution must be taken when interpreting these estimation results. One interesting point worth mentioning here is that the wealthier client groups tend to receive a lesser discount than the less wealthy client groups.
Outfit and Attractiveness
Survey feedback shows that the client's outfit is the third most important indicator that sex workers use to decide whether or not to approach the client and in setting the initial price. I did not find that the client's outfit has any influence in spurring street walkers to make the first move, but do find that better dressed men received a 9 percent (see column (4) in Table 7 ) higher initial price compared to the less well-dressed men. It may be because the outfit of the client is a noisier and hence less reliable signal compared to ethnicity. It makes perfect sense for the situation in the street market where most of clients are less well-off compared to the men in the high-end market and mostly dress casually 22 .
The sex workers' taste-preference for the client's appearance matters only to the extent that attractive-looking men spur more proactive action from street walkers. An above average looking man is 19 percent more likely to be approached by the sex workers. The street walkers' preference for looks maintains a monotonic impact across all client ethnicities. This tendency to approach does not vary by the client's ethnicity. Given the distaste that the sex workers possess against the Indians, being an attractive Indian client can significantly improve the probability (see Column (3) in Table 9 ) of being approached by sex workers (in comparison to the Chinese). The more attractive clients do not receive any preferential asking price, nor do they have a better chance of closing the deal. Thus, sex workers also have a moderate preference for looks, but the preference has limited financial impact.
Conclusion
In this paper, I study the important question of whether discrimination can persist in a competitive market by testing Becker and Diamond's model. Leveraging on the advantage of a rich self-collected panel data from the commercial sex market in Singapore, I successfully show that discrimination can prevail in a perfectly competitive market, which supports Diamond's prediction. Relying on the hybrid theory model I built, I am able to further identify the source of discrimination. I conclude that sex workers practice discrimination using the client's ethnicity as a wealth signal. Different types of sex workers (i.e more attractive vs. less attractive) maintain slightly differentiated discrimination tactics and they adjust their strategies to adapt to market conditions accordingly.
In summary, I find strong evidence of both statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination, although the statistical discrimination exhibits a more dominant influence. Sex workers statistically discriminate against Caucasians and taste discriminate against Indians in comparison with Chinese clients. Statistical discrimination allows sex workers to maximize profit, while taste discrimination allows them to minimize the disutility from working with clients whom they do not prefer. The findings are consistent with the sex workers' self-reported preferences and beliefs. 
